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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE NEW EUROPE : THE PROSPECTS FOR SCOTLAND1 
by Chris Moore, Strathclyde Business School and 
Simon Booth, University of Reading 
INTRODUCTION 
This article looks at the two key forces in the spatial 
development of the EC in the run-up to 1992. On the 
one hand the pressure for greater integration and 
unification around a liberal market economy and on the 
other the fragmentation and defence of 'peripheral' 
regional interests against centralisation. In this context 
peripheral is as much a socio-economic concept as a 
geographical one. These reflections are based on recent 
research into the configuration of regional interests, 
institutions and policy networks in Scotland which need 
to be placed in a wider context of a single European 
marketplace. 
The two European Community developments of the free 
market and social charter (1992) encapsulate this 
powerful and potentially contradictory force. The former 
is based on liberalisation, including the removal of 
barriers and constraints on the movement of goods, 
services and labour within the Community. The latter is 
based on the continental European notion of social 
partnership involving the organised interests of European 
and nation-state institutions, labour and capital. The 
balance between the economic and social forces 
embodied in these two concepts has yet to be worked out 
in terms of which development will dominate in the 
creation of a more united Europe. 
EUROPEANISATION AND THE UK 
From a UK perspective the EC social charter has 
revealed important ideological and political conflicts. For 
the Conservative Government committed to liberal market 
solutions, it is seen as bureaucratic interference. For 
example, the Government has made clear its opposition 
to any plans for legislation to enshrine workers' 
participation at company level, preferring instead an 
evolutionary approach which places more emphasis on 
market-based mechanisms such as share ownership or 
profit sharing than statutory rights to sit on boards [D.E., 
1989]. For the trades unions and the wider labour 
movement the Charter represents an opportunity to 
recover lost ground and gain new advantages in terms of 
social protection and rights. 
EUROPEANISATION AND SCOTLAND 
Sharp and Holmes [1990] have suggested that national 
industrial policies, and in particular corporatist models of 
policy-making and implementation, have declined. By 
corporatism we mean the model of relationship between 
representative associations of business (the CBI, trades 
associations), organised labour (TUC and its affiliated 
unions) and the State (Government through key economic 
departments and para-State agencies) based on dialogue 
at national and sectoral levels which aimed to establish 
areas of agreement about economic and industrial policy. 
NEDO and the offshoot EDCs represent in the UK 
context the peak of this model, although as Grant [1985] 
has pointed out, its significance in terms of actually 
implementing agreed policy or programmes which 
affected behaviour at the level of the individual enterprise 
was not great except in certain tightly organised and 
regulated sectors, eg parts of agriculture. More 
characteristic of the UK industrial policy has been ad hoc 
bargains in defence of crisis industries, or more recently 
to promote newly emerging sectors such as 
telecommunications and electronics [Cawson, 1986], As 
we suggest later we found examples of this more diluted 
form of 'neo-corporatism' in Scotland. 
However, as Sharp and Holmes argue, in place of 
national or regional corporatist arrangements we see the 
emergence of the Europeanisation of policy based on the 
promotion of competitiveness by European firms. A 
significant part of this promotion has been the 
encouragement of collaborative programmes of research, 
development and training, for example in electronics, 
which, when set in the context of industry restructuring, 
have led to the increasing domination of the industry by 
fewer multinational corporations. If this is the case, 
where does it lease the peripheral regions of Europe? 
Below the nation-state level, and specifically from a 
Scottish perspective, the EC represents a threat and 
potential opportunity, but peripherality suggests that 
positive intervention is needed for economic actors to 
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gain benefits and minimise costs. Recent reports suggest 
that without some positive political intervention 
peripheral regions face major job losses [Observer, 
14/1/90]. Arrangements based around a combination of 
Scottish identity, interests and institutions have provided 
possibilities to modify the market pluralism of the centre 
and develop more collectivist solutions to issues of 
industrial development [Moore and Booth, 1989]. This 
has generated policy communities and specific modes of 
public-private interaction. Essential to these 
arrangements is the capacity to translate consensus 
between actors into policy outputs. Regional identity 
and the representation of key interests need institutional 
arrangements with adequate autonomy - resources and 
powers - to produce sufficiently differentiated outputs 
from other spatial areas which comprise the UK nation-
state. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SCOTLAND 
Introduction 
We studied the policy area of industrial development and 
found evidence of a spatial dimension to sectorally based 
arrangements which could not be defined as liberal 
market but which fell short of corporatism as defined by 
Schmitter [1979] because they did not embrace the three 
essential criteria of corporatist relationships, namely : 
centralised representation of interests; high degrees of 
hierarchical control of group members; and responsibility 
for policy outputs. As we have suggested earlier, these 
criteria have never been strong in the UK context despite 
the rhetoric of the Thatcher years against 'corporatist' 
regulation. As Grant [1985] and others have suggested 
centralised (UK) level corporatism has been undermined 
by weak peak associations (the CBI and TUC simply lack 
sufficient authority over their members to enforce 
agreements) and the basic lack of consensus over 
industrial policy during significant periods of the post-war 
period (although this can be overemphasised). On the 
other hand, what we uncovered was not pluralism, where 
organised interests remain essentially outside the policy-
making institutions and function as pressure groups 
lobbying decision-makers but retaining autonomy by 
avoiding co-authorship of policy. When fused with a 
liberal market order this model of pluralistic relationships 
leaves the State primarily in a role of providing a legal 
and fiscal framework with no positive intervention in 
terms of industrial policy. 
We uncovered in sectors of the Scottish economy an 
arena of 'negotiated order' which lies between the 
pluralist and corporatist models. This order embraced a 
range of institutional models, but primarily involved 
formalised bipartite agreements between State actors and 
business interests (represented by trade associations and 
individual enterprises). Notably absent from these 
arrangements were the representatives of organised 
labour, reflecting the ideological preferences of the UK 
government and the relative weakness of the trades union 
movement. 
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We would reject pluralist labels where intermediation 
takes interest roles (whether defined collectively or 
individually, e.g. the firm) into a relationship with the 
State and public policy process and transforms enterprises 
into co-authoTS and agents of policy outputs. A policy 
exchange occurs based on agreement where each party 
cedes certain rights in order to obtain benefits. There is 
a merging of public policy goals and private interest. 
These agreements may be designed to resolve conflicts, 
assist economic adjustment or promote certain desirable 
developments e.g. market development. 
What is the scope of this model of industrial policy-
making in Scotland? Scotland is characterised by 
variable autonomy. Economically it is subject to general 
trends of macro economic policy, which in the 1980s 
primarily meant reduced public sector intervention and 
expenditure especially on industrial policy and an 
emphasis on tax cuts and market operations. This relates 
to political control which in the unitary UK State has 
been seen as increasingly centralised [Crouch and 
Marquand, 1989]. 
We can qualify this broad position of Scottish 
dependence, however. Firstly, economically whilst 
macro policy is subject to central direction, this pattern 
may be more variable at the meso level of the regional 
economy in that different economic or industrial sectors 
exhibit different degrees of indigenous ownership, control 
and autonomy. Secondly, at the political level Scotland 
possesses distinctive characteristics in a number of key 
areas, for example, institutionally it has a separate 
administrative sub-system in the form of the Scottish 
Office. Whilst the Scottish Office is essentially an 
outpost of the UK central State it is rather more than 
simply an administrative agency. It can channel pressure 
from Scotland to the centre and retains a degree of 
policy-making and implementative capacity in several 
policy areas [Keating and Midwinter, 1983]. This 
significantly includes industrial policy. 
This area of autonomy is supported by wider political 
forces - the clearly distinctive electoral composition and 
pattern of party representation reinforced repeatedly at the 
elections of the 1980s - and the social forces of 
nationalism, regional/national identity and its distinctive 
social institutions (legal system, religion and culture). 
All this should not be overplayed. We have argued that 
those who define Scotland as a political system [Kellas, 
1984] may exaggerate this autonomy. On the other 
hand, those who define Scotland simply as an 
administrative sub-system of the UK State [Rose, 1982] 
underplay its relative and variable autonomy. Much 
more satisfactory in analytical terms is a differentiated 
model offered by Keating and Midwinter [1983] which 
suggests variable autonomy in different policy areas 
depending on particular contingent factors. This kind of 
analysis can be applied to the Scottish economy in terms 
of analysing the scope for a differentiated policy output 
distinctive from the UK State. 
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The International Sector and Dependency 
Relationships 
Broadly we can distinguish two major types of industrial 
sector in Scotland. Firstly, the international sector 
which grew in several areas in the post-war period and 
forms the core of major industries such as oil and 
petrochemicals and electronics. This sector is dominated 
by multinationals which have moved into Scotland. The 
infamous 'branch plant' syndrome has been noted [e.g. 
Hood and Young, 1982] although its impact in terms of 
performance is not so clear. Young [1984] observed the 
better performance of externally owned firms in 
comparison to Scottish firms, although in more recent 
times attention has been caught more by closures 
[Haworth, 1987]. 
The electronics industry perhaps best highlights this 
problem. It is an industry which essentially has 
expanded dramatically on the basis of attracting inward 
investment through offering incentives in the face of 
competition from other parts of the UK and Europe. 
This investment is seen as a major input into the Scottish 
economy by official actors such as the IDS and SDA. 
At the same time, observers have noted that it distorts the 
development of the sector [Henderson, 1987]. Whilst 
Scotland may not be a 'typical' underdeveloped assembly 
plant location, neither has it developed a strong and 
independent indigenous base. Perhaps even more 
problematic for bodies such as the SDA is that on its own 
figures [SDA, 1986] the strategy has not had significant 
success in generating substantial contracting and supply 
linkages. 
Such a sector we would characterise as displaying a high 
dependency in terms of its economic structure (high 
degree of external ownership and control - the latter 
being especially important in terms of decisions about 
sourcing) and in terms of industrial policy with the 
institutional actors basing their strategies primarily on 
attracting such investment. The opportunities for 
influencing key players in the sector are limited. The 
best the SDA can hope for is to gear indigenous 
companies towards competing for contracts or finding 
market niches independent of the externally owned part 
of the sector. 
Indigenous Sectors and the Negotiated Order 
The second type of industrial sector is indigenously 
owned and controlled. This has been the sector which 
has been in major decline in general terms for most of 
the post-war period, especially in its manufacturing form. 
However, in certain sectors the Scottish presence is still 
strong, e.g. parts of engineering, clothing, agriculture and 
food and within some sections of finance. In these areas 
it has been possible to develop different forms of 
industrial policy which display in varying degrees the 
possibility for the Scottish Office and its satellite bodies 
to steer a somewhat different course to that of the UK 
State centrally. 
Relationships between the Scottish industrial policy 
institutions and the Scottish private sector will vary 
depending on the structural characteristics of the specific 
sector (is it concentrated or fragmented?), the degree of 
common interests and identity amongst the actors (are 
there areas of collective agreement which could provide 
the basis for collective action or is the sector divided?) 
and the institutional infrastructure (are there collective 
associative bodies which can represent and negotiate for 
the sector and deliver collective agreements; are there key 
firms that could be identified as sector leaders?). 
In our empirical study we did identify sectors where 
forms of positive industrial policy and collective action 
were evident. For example in the Scottish financial 
sector the historical identity of a financial community 
which was increasingly looking to international markets 
for expansion provided opportunities for new forms of 
collective action in the form of Scottish Financial 
Enterprise. This was essentially a marketing and 
promotional organisation sponsored by the industry and 
the SDA which can be viewed partly as a response to 
deregulation and the increasing internationalisation of the 
financial market in all sectors which threatened the 
operational strength of what in global terms were very 
small Scottish players. Through collective action, 
however, it was seen as possible to promote the identity 
of the Scottish industry and to identify market 
opportunities. 
Whilst this area remained largely a fairly weak policy-
making or implementative arena partly given the interests 
of Scottish financial capital in using the indigenous 
identity as a marketing strategy, there was recognition 
that the economic interests of most institutions could be 
threatened through international forces. As Draper et al 
[1985] observe there is a potential or real contradiction 
between an indigenous identity and an international 
orientation. Collective action was therefore fairly limited. 
In other sectors an indigenous identity and economic 
interests did not contradict each other, at least in the short 
to medium term, but provided an opportunity to create 
and sustain collective public-private sector interaction. 
The features of such relationships were first, bilateral 
negotiation between the State (SDA) and industry 
(business associations, firms). Secondly, market 
orientation. These relationships were not products of 
industrial planning but of market weakness or failures. 
Thirdly, the strategy to overcome these weaknesses or 
failures did not rely on the State playing a minimalist 
role but on an active industrial policy which involved 
collective action in the market. Fourthly, the 
relationships were firmly located at the meso or micro 
levels of the economy (specific sectors or firms) and 
involved a programmatic orientation designed io fulfil 
specific objectives. Thus, the relationship could be 
fairly ad hoc in terms of institutional permanence. 
This negotiated agreement can operate at the level of 
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associative order or the enterprise. In the forestry sector 
in the early 1980s Henderson [1984] identified the 
development of collective strategic action based around 
ad hoc institutional arrangements which brought together 
public and private interests to respond to market crisis. 
We found strikingly similar innovation in the woollen 
industry. 
This sector is of significance to the Scottish economy and 
in terms of indigenous involvement represents a high 
degree of Scottish ownership and control. In the 
woollen sector the SDA acted as a catalyst for bringing 
together the fragmented industry associations into a new 
umbrella body, Scottish Woollen Industries (SWI). The 
strategic objective was that through collective action the 
Scottish owned and controlled segment of the industry 
would be in a much better position to enhance its 
international competitiveness than a competitive market 
model would allow. SWI represented some fifty firms 
(92% of the sector in terms of enterprises although 65% 
in terms of employment because the two largest firms 
which were subsidiaries of multinationals did not 
participate). SWI raised funds for collective promotion 
from the industry which were matched by the SDA. In 
total the SDA committed £V4 million of public money 
over five years to SWI which was responsible for running 
collective training, research and development, marketing 
and promotion activities. SWI provided a means of 
fusing industry representation with a public policy 
function which brought together private and public 
interests. To label such an instrument as part of a liberal 
market order is to stretch the term to embrace a fairly 
positive industrial policy role for the State. To call it 
corporatist planning of industry would be equally 
mistaken. What we see here can best be characterised 
as part of a negotiated order of public/private partnership. 
There are certain conditions which seem to be important 
if this type of arrangement is to occur. It is interesting 
to contrast the SWI with attempts during the 1980s to 
create a similar institutional form in the Scottish 
raspberry sector. Scodand accounts for two-thirds of 
European raspberry production and there are some 600 
growers. The indigenous industry was so fragmented 
that when the SDA sought to promote a statutory 
development body for the industry it failed to secure the 
approval of the growers. There was apparently at this 
time no real sense of collective identity or set of interests. 
This does not mean that where an industry lacks sectoral 
cohesion there is no possibility of concerted relationships 
emerging. They are more likely, however, to occur at 
the micro level with public intervention at the level of the 
individual enterprise. This need not be a reactive 
relationship divorced from any sense of sectoral strategy. 
The engineering industry is a good example of this. It 
remains a fairly significant sector in terms of indigenous 
presence but suffers from basic problems. These were 
identified by the SDA in an industry survey in the mid 
1980s. They included a lack of competitiveness, failure 
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to innovate and a fragmented marketing strategy. The 
sector remains important, employing direcdy 40,000 and 
with a turnover of nearly #1.5 billion per annum, but the 
SDA has had only limited success in getting enterprises 
to work with it to improve the innovative capacity and 
marketing strategies. 
What was interesting in terms of industrial policy and 
developing concerted public/private sector relationships 
was that on die basis of its survey the Agency identified 
firms that had survived rationalisation of the sector and 
invited them to contribute to a sector strategy. After 
analysis and discussions, the SDA introduced the 
Business Opportunities Programme (BOP). This 
programme involved working with individual companies 
using techniques developed by the Agency to assess 
commercial opportunities against company resources. 
The BOP was agreed between the Agency and the firm 
setting out targets in terms of new product developments, 
marketing and research. These targets were subject to 
quarterly review. In return for managerial commitment 
to the strategy, the SDA made available its resources to 
help implement any agreed programme - financial 
support, advisory services, technology transfer. 
The reason why the negotiated order took this form radier 
than the associational form of the woollen sector was 
partly because of the absence of appropriate collective 
institutional mechanisms. Whilst the industry might be 
seen as quite rich in terms of representative associations -
the Engineering Council, Engineering Employers 
Federation, Engineering Industries Association - these 
tended to operate at the UK level, were highly 
differentiated in terms of membership, and in key sub-
sectors largely externally owned and controlled. The 
Scottish Engineers Employers Association essentially 
regarded the development of strategy to be a company 
matter. 
Summary 
Scotland does not have an autonomous economy either in 
terms of structure of ownership/control or in terms of 
public policy instruments. But it has had through the 
1980s a distinctive industrial identity, interests and 
institutions which can be said to represent a series of 
policy communities. The SDA has since the mid 1970s 
been a central actor in these communities and in the 
fashioning of a Scottish industrial policy. The 
relationships it has developed with Scottish based (as 
distinct from Scottish owned and controlled) industry 
must be analysed at a sector level if one is to develop 
any sense of understanding of industrial policy in 
Scotland over the last decade. 
In crude terms, we have suggested that we can divide the 
Scottish economy (excluding the rapidly diminishing 
State-owned sector) into a dependency model and a 
negotiated order model in analysing industrial policy and 
public/private relationships. The dependency model is 
characterised by an internationalised market structure 
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where the locus of competition is global. It is 
dominated by externally owned and controlled capital. 
Public policy has reinforced this dependency model 
(some would argue realistically and beneficially for 
Scotland) by basing strategy on attracting and servicing 
its identified requirements. Domestic industry, and 
indeed Scotland in this context, becomes a sub-contracted 
economy. Electronics and oil-related industries are 
classic cases of this dependency model. 
The negotiated order of the Scottish economy and 
industrial policy is more likely to occur in markets with 
relatively high degrees of indigenous ownership and 
control. The focus for such companies need not be the 
local or even UK economy. Indeed, the incentive for 
developing a negotiated order in terms of industrial 
policy and public/private partnerships is often the interest 
of Scottish companies in breaking into overseas markets. 
Without such an order many such companies would lack 
the capacity and competitive position in the world 
economy to make much impact. Collective action is 
thus a means to individual benefit. 
Relationships thus tend to develop into concerted action 
operating at a sectoral level embracing an SDA sector 
strategy, collective industry representation and 
public/private partnership in the formulation and 
implementation of programmes. Alternatively these 
arrangements operate at a sub-sector level but within the 
framework of a strategic conception of development for 
a sector, e.g. engineering or parts of the oil supplies 
industry. 
What has been significant for Scotland over the past 
decade has been the existence of institutional 
arrangements which have provided some room for 
manoeuvre for sectors of the Scottish economy largely 
absent in England. This explains the great interest south 
of the border in regional development agencies which 
now currently inform the Labour Party's industrial and 
regional strategy. The recommendations of left wing 
think tanks trying to mount a counter offensive to the 
liberal market view of industrial development also 
reinforce the argument [Brunskill, 1990]. 
It is therefore ironic that at the moment when this interest 
is intensifying in sections of the English polity the future 
of the Scottish model should appear so much in doubt. 
FUTURE IMPACT 
The kind of arrangements outlined above are not unique. 
They exist in other parts of Europe. Perhaps the most 
often quoted example of the fusion of a strong regional 
political and institutional infrastructure and local 
economic action of a collectivist kind is the so-called 
'Third Italy' based around Emilia-Romagna. Best [1990] 
highlights the ways in which collective private action 
underpinned by the local state is mobilised to overcome 
the limitations in the marketplace of any one individual 
enterprise. For example, in the textile sector the 
regional government's economic development agency has 
helped establish public/private funded and managed 
information centres which support marketing and 
technological innovation. 
How win the European dimension affect Scottish 
arrangements? There is an unclear scenario for future 
EC institutional arrangements and the likely degree of 
supranational integration - made more confusing by 
developments in Eastern Europe. There have been signs 
of regionalism which may push for greater differentiation 
of territorial governance to reflect divergent identities and 
interests leading to new institutional arrangements. 
These arrangements may become more significant if the 
nation-state becomes less important either de jure, e.g. 
ceding authority to EC institutions, or de facto as 
economic, social and political movements run in 
contradictory directions - economic concentration through 
multinationals v demands for greater regional self-
identity. As Kellas [1990] observes, the paradox of 
supranationalism as represented by European integration 
and sub-state nationalism and regionalism is explained by 
the diminishing role of the nation-state. This is to some 
extent encouraged by EC regional policy which 
increasingly seeks to mobilise regional policy networks 
rather than national systems. The paradox is that unlike 
the regions of Spain, Scotland is not recognised in EC 
terms because it has no constitutional basis despite a 
clearly distinctive practice. 
The position of peripheral regions such as Scotland is 
unclear. There is a twin threat to any distinctive 
negotiated order. Firstly, from a central government 
continually pushing for market solutions and mobilising 
the power of the central state to achieve this end. The 
decision to replace the Scottish Development Agency, 
which has been at the centre of a distinctive regional 
industrial policy in Scotland for the last 15 years, by a 
private sector dominated Scottish Enterprise which will 
distribute funds to a network of local enterprise 
companies could undermine any sense of regional, i.e. 
Scottish, coherence in industrial development. The 
emphasis in the new structure is on privatisation, or at 
least private sector leadership of publicly funded 
programmes. The role of local government and the 
regional institutions of negotiated bargaining and 
selective public intervention are clearly under threat 
[Moore, 1989]. The most serious implication for the 
new model is the potential weakening of the strategic 
integrative vision represented by the SDA [Hood, 1991]. 
Secondly, the EC dimension. If 1992 crystallises around 
a liberal competitive market model the future for 
peripheral regions looks bleak, especially if the 
institutional defences which previously existed are 
progressively dismantled. At the same time, however, the 
Single European Market is concerned with balanced 
growth which can be interpreted to mean assistance to 
lagging regions in the form of legitimised arrangements 
which allow for public intervention in economic sectors 
to ease transition and to provide for positive adjustment 
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strategies. Institutionalised insulation which is based on 
the premise of working towards economic adjustment 
could help minimise peripheral dislocation. The 
example of the SDA in Scotland, regional development 
agencies in Wales, Northern Ireland, Southern Ireland, 
Italy and West Germany illustrate the importance of such 
distinctive institutionalised partnerships. Whedier these 
arrangements emerge and are sustained seems to depend 
on three variables which could be measured. Firsdy, the 
level of territorial identity at the regional level. This 
could be indicated by the strength of identity as revealed 
by mass survey techniques. The degree of consensus 
over certain values could also be measured through 
survey and interviews. Finally, at this level the 
existence of relatively autonomous socio-cultural 
institutions is important. 
Secondly, the institutional variable. This includes the 
strength of political and institutional networks and the 
degree of delegated responsibility for policy-making and 
resource allocation. This can be measured by political 
institutional analysis, for example through Rhodes' 
resource dependency model [Rhodes, 1988], analysis of 
formal constitutional provisions and analysis of budgetary 
data. 
The third variable is die organisation and representation 
of regional interests. In an interesting study of business 
interests Coleman and Jacek [1989] have examined the 
significance of territorial representation and policy-
making in several capitalist economies and found that in 
certain cases the representation of business might subdue 
territorial differentiation, but in others it could reinforce 
and identify strongly with regionalism. Certainly whilst 
there may be strong centralising tendencies in the 
capitalist economy this does not mean that territorial 
interests no longer matter. 
In the light of EC developments the case for a 
regionalised negotiated order - whether formalised as 
corporatist or alternative models of public/private 
concertation - is powerful as a source of positive 
adjustment to market change and restructuring. Such 
regionalisation provides a counterbalance to the 
globalisation and Europeanisation identified by Sharp and 
Holmes [1990]. Unless the regional dimension is 
sufficiently recognised by both EC and national policy-
makers the push towards . 1992 is likely to create 
significant territories of disadvantage and disaffection 
which is likely to reinforce demands for greater regional 
autonomy, as has occurred in Spain. 
Not all segments of capital based in Scotland will be 
interested in this argument. Multinational corporations 
and externally owned capital have interests which lie 
beyond Scotland. Multinational corporate capital has an 
identity with, and interest in, the Scottish economy as a 
site of production or market but this interest is clearly 
subordinate to global corporate strategy. The leverage 
of public bodies over these corporations is limited. 
Other forms of capital may also increasingly identify 
their interests as lying beyond Scotland, but the crucial 
difference is that their corporate strategies are formulated 
from within Scotland. This gives Scotland several 
advantages in terms of protection from rationalisation and 
as a site of significant employment. The capacity of 
many Scottish firms to break into these wider markets 
may depend on forms of State support. Capital in 
Scotland may not wear a kilt, but some firms need the 
support of a tartan industrial policy. 
An appeal to Scottish capital in supporting a distinctive 
institutional negotiated order for industrial policy does 
not have to be made in terms of an 'idealistic' and 
'naive' appeal to national identity. Such identity may 
have an influence, but it is subordinate to long term 
economic self interest. But as the example of the Third 
Italy illustrates, strong regional institutions can support 
economic interests in surviving and prospering in an 
international market place. In a Europe of the regions it 
will be those localities which have developed an 
institutional infrastructure, collective interest and sense of 
identity which are likely to perform better economically, 
or at least protect themselves from the negative impacts 
of market adjustment. 
Scotland had diis potential even during much of the 
1980s with a hostile central government. But whether 
this potential exists for the 1990s, when the challenge 
comes from beyond Whitehall, is less clear. It is 
important that the interests involved recognise the threat 
and prosecute their interests at the EC level if they wish 
to maintain the advantages they have had in the past. 
The prospects of this occurring are, however, limited 
unless Scottish interests can develop the same kinds of 
links with Brussels as they have developed with 
Edinburgh and thus begin to compete effectively with 
continental European associational interests. 
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